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THE PRAYER AMENDMENT: A REBUTTAL
Fred 1. Schwengel *
THE PROPOSED PRAYER AMENDMENT
Men's minds are inspired to their sharpest activity when
they are given good reason. Some type of stimulus is needed
to spark the thoughts which lead us to form our opinions. We
seldom have the time or incentive to consider issues simply
because they exist. Men in different roles respond to stimuli
in different ways. Their education, training and experience
dictate these responses.
We in the Congress must be elected after regular periods
of time, and if a Congressman is not responsive and effective
in promoting his constituents' interests during the term, he
will not be re-elected. Legislators are thus encouraged to act
relatively quickly, and to judge their own effectiveness against
relatively short-term goals. Legislation can, however, have
long-range implications not readily apparent or discernible
upon even the most studied short-term consideration. For this
and other reasons, laws are interpreted and reviewed by
courts. The judges are not subject to re-election and may,
therefore, take a less hurried approach in considering deci-
sions and their long-range implications.
The courts have been engaged in the continuous, ongoing
task of developing principles for the implementation of the
First Amendment and applying it to states' actions since
1940.1 The so-called "school prayer" cases were presented to
the Court as more problems to be resolved in the continuation
of this development of principle. The decisions represent se-
rious consideration of arguments on both sides of the issues,
including all short and long-range implications, and the final
drawing of well-considered conclusions.
The "school prayer" cases apparently represented an
entirely different type of stimulus to some of my colleagues
* Representative from 1st Congressional District of Iowa in 84th-8Sth and
90th-92nd Congresses. A.B., Northeast Missouri Teachers College; Graduate
work at University of Iowa; Honorary Doctor of Laws degrees at Parsons
College and Lincoln College; President, U.S. Capitol Historical Society.
1. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (applying the First
Amendment to the states by means of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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in Congress, and the actions they took were illustrative of this
difference. While the Court considered the cases in the process
of extending the development of the First Amendment, my
colleagues apparently considered these cases as a threat to
religion, and the proposed amendment represented a reaction
to the perceived injury. The thinking involved in this proposal
was prompted by a desire to reach one specific conclusion-
to defend that which was threatened-and later to support
that conclusion, rather than by a desire to consider all the
arguments and to reach whichever conclusion best resolved
the problem. H.R.J. Res. 191, while it represented a serious
effort on the part of its proponents, was but one of a flock
of proposals designed and considered with one purpose in
mind-to overturn the Court's prayer decisions. The reason-
ing behind it was mere justification or rationalization, rather
than objective inquiry and deliberation. This amendment, as
a reaction and not an action, would have flown in the face of
long-term principles which have been developed as our Con-
stitution was intended, with a view to long-range growth.
It was the result of a legislator's quick reaction to promote
one specific result, as opposed to the Court's careful study
of a problem in a context of historical development, precedent,
and future development.
The Congressional Record of November 8, 1971, when
the proposed amendment was discharged from the House
Judiciary Committee for one hour of debate and a final de-
cision, illustrates the Procrustean character of Mr. Wylie's
proposed amendment. He discussed some of the more pub-
licized "school prayer" cases, and concluded: "This is the ludi-
crous extreme to which we -have arrived about this matter
of prayer in public schools, and that is why we need House
Joint Resolution 191 to clarify the situation." 2
There was a strong feeling throughout the country that
the Court had banned prayer from the schools and made them
hostile to religion. Nothing could be further from the truth.
This author is not anti-religious. He is convinced that Wash-
ington was right when he said in effect in his farewell address
that religion and morality are indispensable to political pros-
perity. It was the opinion of many, including myself, that the
adoption of the Wylie Amendment would do violence to the
2. 117 Cong. Rec. H10590 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1971).
724 [V7ol. 24
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religious guarantees of the First Amendment. This made the
question extremely important. Now, let us analyze the facts.
The case of Engel v. Vitale,3 while not the first case in-
validating religious exercises in the public schools, was the
stimulant of the most controversy over prayer, and brought
on the first of the barrage of proposed Constitutional amend-
ments. 4 In this case, the Court ruled that a prayer composed
by the New York Board of Regents and required by a school
district was an unconstitutional establishment of religion.
Speaking through Justice Black, the Engel Court further
developed the definition of an "establishment" of religion
which Justice Black had offered in the case of Everson v.
Board of Education fifteen years earlier. 5 The Court in Engel
said that the establishment clause "must at least mean that
in this country it is no part of the business of government to
compose official prayers for any group of the American people
to recite as a part of a religious program carried on by gov-
ernment."6
Abington School District v. Schempp, together with a
companion case, Murray v. Curlett,7 apparently was a fan to
the flames of public confusion and hostility which Engel had
sparked. In this case, which many jurists regard as far more
significant than Engel, the Court's previous establishment
clause decisions were integrated and the Court's policy was
made explicit.
3. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
4. The reaction here was, in fact, instantaneous. The day after Engel was
reported, June 26, 1962, eight Constitutional amendments to permit prayer in
public schools were introduced. H.R.J. Res. 752-59, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1962).
5. "The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at
least this: Neither a state nor the federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to
remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or
disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or pro-
fessing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance.
No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious
activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they
may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Gov-
ernment can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious orga-
nizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect a 'wall of separation
between Church and State.'" Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
6. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962).
7. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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In Schempp, a Pennsylvania statute provided for the com-
pulsory reading, without comment, of ten verses of the Holy
Bible as part of the opening exercises in the public schools.
Provision was made for excusing children upon written re-
quest of the parents. In Murray v. Curlett, a similar Maryland
statute provided for the "reading, without comment, of a
chapter in the Holy Bible and/or the use of the Lord's Pray-
er." The cases were joined by the Court because they pre-
sented similar questions. The Court found that both statutes
violated the establishment clause by breaching the neutrality
imposed upon the Federal and state governments by the First
and Fourteenth Amendments.
Justice Clark, writing the majority opinion, reviewed the
significant prior cases and reaffirmed Engel's holding that
the establishment clause prohibits government-sponsored re-
ligious exercises in the public schools. The really crucial part
of the establishment clause interpretation, and the part which
fused the previous decisions into an explicit principle, was
the statement that the First Amendment requires neutrality. 9
Neutrality had become the Court's working model of the
First Amendment's strictures, and the test for neutrality was
this question: "What are the purpose and the primary effect
of the enactment?"1O Neutrality was neither a new nor an
unnecessarily broad concept. The purpose and primary effect
test had first been stated in the Sunday Blue Law Cases such
as McGowan v. Maryland." It was a logical outgrowth of the
First Amendment's twin establishment and free exercise
clauses. The First Amendment of the Constitution provides:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . ." These
clauses simply represent the different sides of the same coin,
the "establishment" clause prohibiting government from
establishing or promoting its own religion, and the "free
exercise" clause prohibiting government from impairing or
limiting the religious freedom of the people. The effect of
these clauses is an admonition that government should neither
aid nor injure religion-in short, that government's relation
to religion should be neutral.
8. Id. at 211.
9. Id. at 215.
10. Id. at 222.
11. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
[Vol. 24
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The Court's development of the establishment clause had
really begun in the case of Everson v. Board of Education,
12
where Justice Black gave the oft-quoted definition of estab-
lishment and affirmed the Jeffersonian "wall of separation
between Church and State."'
13
Separation of Church and State was certainly a clear-cut
means whereby religion and the government would be pro-
tected from each other's influences. However, it gave little
guidance to the Court for deciding upon specific limits upon
the government in actual cases. Complete separation of
Church and State would actually result in government hos-
tility to religion; but, at the least, general public welfare
services must be provided for religious institutions. The
Everson Court recognized this, and said that public welfare
services, such as fire protection, are legitimate examples of
government involvement in religious institutions. 14 Accord-
ingly, the Court by a five-four vote sustained New Jersey's
program for paying for bus transportation of children to
parochial as well as public schools. The Court characterized
the program as a "public welfare" measure, and said it was
within the state's constitutional power, "even though it ap-
proaches the verge of that power."' 5 The government, said
the Court, could not exclude citizens, because of their religion,
from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation.
The "separation of church and state" ideal, being of little
practical value, later became workable when determined by
the "purpose and primary effect" test. This formula was first
used as the pivotal test in the case of Illinois ex rel. McCollum
v. Board of Education,'6 where the Court invalidated a "re-
leased time" plan of religious instruction in public schools
during regular school hours. The state could maintain an
effective separation from the Church only if enactments had
a secular purpose and a primary effect that neither advanced
nor inhibited religion. In McCollum, the Court found that
the state was using its public school program as a means of
encouraging and 'pressuring children to attend religious
classes. The majority pointed out that "[t]he State also af-
12. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
13. See note 5 supra.
14. 330 U.S. at 17-18.
15. Id. at 16.
16. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
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fords sectarian groups an invaluable aid in that it helps to
provide pupils for their religious classes through use of the
state's compulsory public school machinery."'u
The "purpose and primary effect" doctrine was sharply
limited in the case of Zorach v. Clauson,18 where a similar
"released time" program was upheld because it was held off
the school premises. Government time and facilities were used
neither to aid nor to impair religion, but were directed toward
government's own ends, while the children were released be-
fore the close of the school day and were free to attend classes
of religious instruction. The theory the Court used to distin-
guish this program and explain its constitutional validity was
"accommodation."' 19 The accommodation theory unquestion-
ably shaded the lines drawn by the Court with its "purpose
and primary effect" test in McCollum. While the purpose of
the government action was by no means purely secular, the
program's real effect was neither to promote nor to impair
religion in such a way as to threaten the integrity of the First
Amendment. The government was accommodating the spirit-
ual and religious nature of the people; but whereas in McCol-
lum the religious instructor was placed in precisely the same
position of authority as the school teacher in the government's
educational institution, the children were simply released from
the government's control in Zorach.20
Justice Douglas explained that the state was not meddling
in religion, but merely following "the best of our traditions"
by respecting the "religious nature of our people" and accom-
modating the public service "to their spiritual needs." 21
The introduction of the "accommodation" theory to bal-
ance the "purpose and primary effect" test brought the final
demise of the general ideal of "separation of church and
state." The state could now accommodate religion with re-
leased time programs as well as police and fire protection,
and the integrity of the First Amendment would still be pre-
served. A new expression of the First Amendment's meaning
was needed, and in the Schempp case "separation of church
17. Id. at 212.
18. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
19. Id. at 315.
20. For a more detailed explanation distinguishing McCollum and Zorach,
see Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 261-63.
21. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).
[Vol. 24
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and state" was replaced with "neutrality." Neutrality had
been mentioned in several previous cases, including Everson,
Zorach, and Engel; and in Schempp, neutrality became part
of a concrete holding. Justice Clark explained that neutrality
is called for by both clauses of the First Amendment, the
establishment clause prohibiting official support "of one or
of all orthodoxies," and the free exercise clause guaranteeing
the right of each person to "choose his own course" and rec-
ognizing "the value of religious training, teaching, and ob-
servance."
22
Also in Schempp, the concurring Justices further devel-
oped the accommodation theory which the Court had set out
in Zorach. The accommodation principle, as balanced against
the requirement of secular "purpose and primary effect,"
provided a ready-made limit, as well as the impetus; for the
new ideal of neutrality, for as Mr. Justice Goldberg stated:
[U]ntutored devotion to the concept of neutrality can lead to the
invocation or approval of results which partake . .. of a brooding and
pervasive devotion to the secular and passive, or even active, hostility
to the religious. Such results are not only not compelled by the Con-
stitution, but, it seems to me, are prohibited by it .... Government
must inevitably take cognizance of the existence of religion and indeed,
under certain circumstances the First Amendment may require that
to do so.
2 3
Justice Goldberg then explained that examples of government
recognition of the people's religious nature could be expanded
because "both the required and the permissible accommoda-
tions between state and church frame the relation as one free
of hostility or favor and productive of religious and political
harmony, but without undue involvement of one in the con-
cerns or practices of the other."
24
In addition to Justice Goldberg, Justice Clark agreed
that the State may not affirmatively oppose or show hostility
to religion, 25 and Justice Brennan recognized that "[i]nevi-
tably, insistence upon neutrality, vital as it surely is for un-
trammeled religious liberty, may appear to border upon
religious hostility."2 6
22. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
23. Id. at 306 (Justice Goldberg concurring).
24. Id.
25. 374 U.S. at 225.
26. Id. at 246 (Justice Brennan concurring).
7
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Despite these Justices' careful balancing of neutrality
with accommodation, some attacks have been made upon the
neutrality principle as a misreading of the establishment
clause which does exactly what the Court so carefully guarded
against, by establishing a government "religion of secularism"
in hostility to all religions.2 7 Mindful of this argument, Justice
Clark discussed the possibility of the state establishing a re-
ligion of "secularism" in the Schempp case, and specifically
rejected the idea that the decision had that effect.28 The flaw
in the foundation of the "religion of secularism" argument
is a misunderstanding of the Court's development of the First
Amendment principles. Again, the Court has been deciding
establishment clause cases involving the relationship of church
and state in the context of well-developed principles while its
critics, including legislators, have only been involved with
the issues since their recent reaction to a few individual cases.
The neutrality ideal was developed because of the un-
avoidable hostility to religion the Court found in the "separa-
tion of church and state" language. The "accommodation"
theory ushered in the new ideal because the Court found that
government could accommodate the .people's religious and
spiritual nature, making total separation unnecessary, while
remaining effectively neutral. In fact, the instances which
critics point to as examples of government sponsorship of
religion-the morning devotions in Congress and the Supreme
Court, religious references in patriotic songs, religious mottos
on our coins, etc.-can easily be distinguished from official
prayers in public schools because they are simply more ex-
amples of government's accommodation of the religious and
spiritual nature of the people. The government, rather than
actively promoting religion through its public school system
and its control over impressionable children, is simply accom-
modating the religion that already exists. Justice Brennan
took the trouble to list several categories of permissible ac-
commodation in his Schempp opinion,29 and several cases have
27. Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School Board, 14 LAW &
CONTEMP. PRoB. 3, 9-16 (1949) ; Calhoun, School Prayer in Short Perspective,
38 CONN. B.J. 643, 647-51 (1964) ; Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 313 (Justice Stewart dissenting).
28. 374 U.S. at 225.
29. Id. at 294-304 (Justice Brennan concurring). For a list of all the ref-
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found various accommodations permissible under the First
Amendment.8 0
In spite of these permissible accommodations, critics in-
sist that the Court has established a "religion of secularism."
The "religion of secularism" argument goes basically as fol-
lows: While the free exercise clause was meant to include
all sects and religious interests, thereby providing freedom
for all, the establishment clause was not meant to be all-
inclusive. A proper reading of the establishment clause in-
cludes only the recognized theistic sects, or "religions," and
really only prohibits government sponsorship of one particu-
lar sect in preference to others. Therefore, government aid
to all recognized sects, or religions in general, is allowable.
However, since the Court has included all religious interests 1
in the establishment clause's definition of religion as well as
in the free exercise clause, government may not establish even
a program of aid to religions in general. Therefore, by includ-
ing non-theistic interests (atheism, agnosticism, etc.) in the
prohibitions against government establishment, the Court
forces government to abstain from aiding those truly religious
interests, and establishes a "religion of secularism."
The most obvious flaw in this "religion of secularism"'
argument is that the Constitution simply does not say what
this argument insists it says. The First Amendment reads,
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion . . . ." To prohibit government establishment of an
official sect, the framers could have easily written the neces-
sary language. Instead, after 60 days of committee hearings
and 11 days of floor debate, they adopted the amendment as
it reads today. Of course, we were asked to "clarify" this lan-
guage on November 8th, 1971, in the space of one hour.8 2
The Court's critics continue, however, that the legislative
history and documents preserved from the drafting of the
30. Swallow v. United States, 325 F2d 97 (10th Cir. 1963), cert. denied'
377 U.S. 951 (1964).; Murray v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 241 Md. 383,
216 A.2d 897, cert. denied 385 U.S. 816 (1966).
31. "Among religions in this country which do not teach what would gen-
"erally be considered a belief in the existence of God are Buddhism, Taoism,
Ethical.Culture, Secular Humanism and others." Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S
488, 495 n. 11 (1961).
32. See 117 Cong. Rec. H10647 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1971) (remarks of Con-
gressman Mikva)..
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First Amendment show that despite the language, the framers
actually intended that the First Amendment mean "an estab-
lishment of an officially preferred sect" rather than "an
establishment of religion." This argument is also sadly mis-
conceived. History has provided some clues as to the intent
of the authors in drafting all types of legislation, but few
jurists would be so foolish as to regard it as conclusive. In
the first place, if we are to study legislative records for de-
finitive statements of intent, the first problem we will con-
front is "whose intent?" Debates preceding passage of legis-
lation include widely divergent views, and to pick any one or
even several legislators' statements as representative of the
entire legislative body would be a fruitless undertaking. Also,
even if we can trace the statements made by the sponsors
or authors of a proposal, how can we say that their intent
deserves more attention than any other group in the legisla-
ture? Why should the intent of any individual or group carry
extra weight when the entire body participates in the debate,
and a majority is needed to approve and pass the legislation?
Secondly, the legislative history of the First Amendment
is especially inconsistent.3  Justice Brennan accurately ob-
served:
A too literal quest for the advice of the Founding Fathers upon the
issues of these cases seems to me futile and misdirected for several
reasons: First, on our precise problem the historical record is at best
ambiguous, and statements can readily be found to support either side
of the proposition.
34
In fact, the historical evidence as to the framers' intent is
considered by several writers to support the inclusive defini-
tion of the establishment clause which the Court developed
and which the Court's critics attack.
35
The Court itself dismissed the point unceremoniously in
its first significant church-state case 6 and again expressly
repudiated the "intent" argument the next year.
3
33. Sky, The Establishment Clause, the Congress and the Schools: An
Historical Perspective, 52 VA. L. RFv. 1395, 1402 (1966).
34. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 237 (1963) (Justice
Brennan concurring).
35. Sky, supra note 33, at 1403, 1416-21. See also Calm, On Government
and Prayer, 37 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 981 (1962); Calm, The "Establishment of Re-
ligion" Puzzle, 36 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1274 (1961).
36. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
37. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211 (1948).
732 [Vol. 24
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Finally, the Constitution is meaningful only as a living
document. It must be interpreted in order to offer meaningful
guidance in new and modern situations. If it needs no legal
interpretation today, the Supreme Court should not be doing
so, and we should select a group of historians to simply search
the documents and explain the framers' intent, which we
should then follow absolutely. The absurdity of supposing that
the framers' intent should override our Court's interpretation
can be fully realized when we consider the fact that the fram-
ers could not possibly have even imagined the problems of
prayer in the public schools. There were no public schools as
we know them when the framers lived; education was carried
on almost completely in church-related schools where religious
exercises were accepted without question.
38
As well as being correct as a matter of logical interpre-
tation and more than able to withstand attacks from a his-
torical perspective, the school prayer cases were decided in
the best way with regard to policy. The right to pray is pres-
ently quite safe. Students, or anyone, may pray voluntarily.
Religion has not been banned from the schools; rather, the
government establishment, however subtle, has been pro-
hibited. Religion is a subtle issue, and the Court has treated
it with the proper sensitivity. In fact, the Court's decisions
allow the State to accommodate student prayers as long as the
government stays neutral.
Also, the study of the Bible or courses in comparative
religion were expressly allowed, and even encouraged, by the
Court in Schempp, where it was stated:
In addition, it might well be said that one's education is not complete
without a study of comparative religion or the history of religion and
its relationship to the advancement of civilization. It certainly may be
said that the Bible is worthy of study for its literary and historic
qualities. Nothing we have said here indicates that such study of the
Bible or of religion, when presented objectively as part of a secular
program of education, may not be effected consistently with the First
Amendment.3 9
The Court's decisions not only allow accommodations of reli-
gion by the schools, but also encourage religious studies. In
fact, the neutrality principle has even been used to protect
religion from attacks by the state. In a city college of New
38. Sky, i pra note 33, at 1403-04.
39. 374 U.S. at 225.
11
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York, derogatory attacks upon religion were published in stu-
-dent newspapers, and the Court ruled that the state's facilities
could not be used to attack religion, but were required to
maintain neutrality.4
0
In spite of this seemingly logical and ultimately reason-
able development of the First Amendment principles by the
Court, my fellow Representatives felt that religion has been
wronged and proposed an amendment to the Constitution in
order to overturn the recent decisions.
The working language of the amendment, in its original
form, read as follows:
Section 1. Nothing contained in this Constitution shall abridge the
right of persons lawfully assembled, in any public building which
is supported in whole or in part through the expenditure of public
funds, to participate in nondenominational prayer.
Understandably, the consideration of this amendment
brought to light several disturbing problems which apparently
had not been discernible to its authors in the short time before
they introduced it. An analysis introduced by Representative
Edwards of California on the day of the vote underscored the
amendment's shortsightedness. This analysis came from a let-
ter by Professor Charles L. Black, Jr., of the Yale Law School,
which appeared in the Washington Post on November 3,
1971:41
The astounding thing about this text is that it addresses itself only
by indirection, if at all, to the problem which actually interests its
sponsors, and which actually concerned the Supreme Court in the cases
it is designed to overrule or weaken-the problem of official prayer
in the public schools. The question in the school prayer cases was not
whether people might sometimes lawfully pray in buildings supported
in whole or in part by public funds. The question was whether chil-
dren not so much 'lawfully assembled' in public buildings as coerced
into assembling in public buildings by the truancy laws, could lawfully
be forced either to pray, or to stand silent during a prayer conducted
in their coerced presence, or to be sent into the hall or in some other
way marked as deviants, with all that means to a child ....
Specifically, then, the amendment was supposed to correct
an action that the Court never took. Secondly, the amendment,
if placed in the Constitution, would not do what the sponsors
claimed for it. It would authorize for the first time the govern-
40. Panarella v. Birnbaum, 60 Misc. 2d 95 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
41. 117 Cong. Rec. H10626-27 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1971).
[Vol. 24
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ment's intrusion into the field of religion; and it contains
several open-ended terms that require definition, obviously by
those governmental bodies who seek to enforce school prayer.
Though written to allow rather than to limit prayer in
the schools, this language would go far beyond the specific
result its sponsors sought. Any controlling body would of
necessity follow the guidelines set out in the language of the
amendment, and would be saddled with the task of limiting
government prayers to those authorized in the amendment.
How would this controlling body know where to stop? Which
groups are lawfully assembled? Visitors at a hospital? Dem-
onstrators? And what buildings are "public buildings sup-
ported in whole or in part through the expenditure of public
funds"? Would this include hospitals? Many church-sponsored
hospitals are supported by public funds. In fact, churches are
indirectly supported by the government through tax exemp-
tions. Where would the line be drawn?
Finally, someone would have to decide upon the content
of a "nondenominational prayer." Justice Black's remarks in
the Torcaso v. Watkins decision 42 suggested some of the con-
fusion that "nondenominational prayer" must produce. Nearly
all the major religious denominations, over 38 of them, op-
posed H.J. Res. 191.
43
Who would write and define such a prayer? For a de-
tached observer, attempting to be objective, this must be an
impossible task. Of course, the term "nondenominational"
would actually be defined by the very school board or other
school authority who wants to write and sponsor the prayer.
Mr. Wylie himself admitted that the "local school authori-
ties" would compose or select a prayer and also determine
whether it was nondenominational, subject to judicial review
in case of abuse.
44
This is a classic case of making the goat the keeper of
the cabbage patch, except that the "cabbage patch" here hap-
pens to be the spiritual attitudes and understanding of our
nation's children. Who can possibly believe that the very
people who write and sponsor a prayer would be willing to
42. See note 31 supra.
43. 117 Cong. Rec. H10590 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1971) (remarks of Con-
gressman Celler).
44. 117 Cong. Rec. H10248 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1971).
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objectively criticize that prayer against the standard of non-
denominationalism? The danger is not reduced by the fact
that the authorities' decisions are subject to judicial review.
Each and every objectionable prayer must be attacked in the
courts. Private citizens should not be forced to spend unlim-
ited amounts of time and money in protecting the spiritual
well-being of their children. No private citizen has the money
or the time to outlast the local government in court battles.
Even if the private citizen could muster the resources to take
his case to court, he would be forced to ask one branch of the
government to overturn prayers sponsored by another branch.
This is hardly a picture of freedom of religion and conscience
that the First Amendment envisions.
The amendment assumed a natural right to participate
in nondenominational prayer. It mentioned no right to refrain
from such participation. This language had uncertain and
definitely unsettling implications on the Constitution's second
religious safeguard, the "free exercise" clause, which pro-
hibits government incursions on the people's free exercise of
religion. By its silence, it left unanswered the question of
whether participation was to be voluntary.
Certainly, the amendment would forbid truly voluntary
prayer, for truly voluntary prayer would reflect the influence
of each child's individual sect, and would not pass the test
of nondenominationalism. Hopefully, the First Amendment
would remain sufficiently intact, even after the distortion the
Wylie Amendment would cause, so that the free exercise
clause would protect dissenters from being forced to partici-
pate in nondenominational prayer. However, we have already
seen that free exercise would be stretched thin by the neces-
sary limiting of school prayers to nondenominational prayers,
and no one could be sure where the disintegration of the free
exercise clause would stop. If religious freedom must be lim-
ited to nondenominational prayer and voluntary prayer may
be forbidden, one further limit of freedom might be easy. The
right to refrain from participation could easily be next to fall.
Even if provision were made for nonparticipation, chil-
dren would be forced into a situation even worse than those
the Court found unhealthy in the school prayer cases. Chil-
dren would be faced with a choice of mechanically repeating
an officially-composed, teacher-directed, and ultimately con-
736 [Vol. 24
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fusing "nondenominational prayer," or leaving the room to
stand in the hall, or sitting in silence, a mute minority in the
midst of their classmates. Even for children who resign them-
selves to conformity, the picture is unpleasant. They are
taught a set of very specific and individual beliefs in the
church, where they voluntarily attend and learn, usually one
day each week. Then, for five days each week, they are re-
quired to attend school, where they are told by their teacher,
whom they are expected to believe and respect, that uttering a
confusing and nebulous nondenominational prayer is a proper
religious exercise. The effect of all this would certainly be to
establish in each child's mind a hostility between church and
state. He may ask his teacher, "Why can't we pray the Lord's
Prayer?" The teacher's answer must be, "Because that's not
nondenominational." Thus, those very legislators who criticize
the Court for establishing a "religion of secularism" would
simply replace it with a religion of "nondenominationalism."
Finally, the amendment itself cannot enact official pray-
ers. Rather, it would require enabling legislation, presumably
by the states. This would produce another array of problems
to which the amendment's sponsors have apparently not ad-
dressed themselves. Several states are precluded from spon-
soring official prayer by the safeguards in their own consti-
tutions, 45 and the resulting conflict between the United States
and state constitutions would then have to be resolved. Either
the Wylie Amendment would make the safeguards of the state
constitutions unconstitutional (probably not, since it prob-
ably is not applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment) or those states would not allow official prayer while
all other states would. What a travesty this would be when
our "rights" enumerated in the Constitution would vary from
state to state! The Court has repeatedly warned against a
situation where one's fundamental rights may be submitted
to a vote or made to depend on the outcome of an election.
46
The Wylie Amendment was changed during the one-hour
debate on November 8th by striking the word "nondenomina-
tional," replacing it with "voluntary," and adding the words
"or meditation" to the end of the sentence. Thus, as amended,
the proposal read: ". . . to participate in voluntary prayer
45. See 117 Cong. Rec. H10649 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1971) (remarks of Con-
gressman Meeds).
46. See, e.g., Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
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or meditation. ' 47 Understandably, this change solved few of
the problems associated with the original amendment, and
created others that would have led to even greater outrages.
The most glaring flaw in the amendment as changed is
that it would allow denominational prayer. This, of course,
is a return to the situation which the Court found unsupport-
able in the original "school prayer" cases. The amendment
in its final form would have, however, not only reverted to
the original situation with its attendant evils, but it would
have made things substantially worse. Though the amendment
might be interpreted as its sponsors intended, we are now
aware of the foolishness of supposing that the legislator's
intent (which legislator?) can offer any real guide to the
courts for interpreting legislation. The language itself is far
from clear, and could lend itself to at least two different,
unanticipated, and unsavory interpretations.
In the first place, if the courts interpret the amendment
to protect only prayer which is truly voluntary, they must
necessarily strike down prayers which are composed by school
authorities and directed by teachers. The Court stressed the
coercive nature of such prayers in several of the original
school prayer cases, and there is no reason to believe that the
courts will ignore this coercion in the future.
In the Engel decision, Justice Black explained that,
"[w]hen the power, prestige and financial support of gov-
ernment is placed behind a particular religious belief, the
indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to con-
form to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain."
48
Justice Black continued, citing the warning of James Madi-
son: "It is proper to take alarm at the first experiment of
our liberties . ..."49
The Court found such psychological pressures particu-
larly oppressive to children, and in the McCollum case stated:
"The law of imitation operates, and non-conformity is not an
outstanding characteristic of children. The result is an obvious
pressure upon children to attend." 50
47. 117 Cong. Rec. H10644, 10657 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1971).
48. 370 U.S. at 431.
49. Id. at 436.
50. 333 U.S. at 227.
[Vol. 24738
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The trouble with calling school-directed prayers volun-
tary, as ably pointed out by Representative Gallagher during
the debate on November 8, is that it requires a positive act
of abstention by any dissenting child.5 ' How can we call a
practice voluntary which requires a greater effort to abstain
than to participate?
Also, an amendment authorizing the government to enact
measures for voluntary meditation is almost laughable in its
absurdity. If a child wants to meditate, who on earth can
control his thoughts and restrain him? Meditation cannot be
anything but voluntary, and an amendment empowering the
government to influence meditation seems hardly to envision
truly voluntary meditation, but rather government control
over the religious thoughts of our children. In the final analy-
sis, the Wylie Amendment does not say what its sponsors
intended, for their intent simply was not to authorize truly
voluntary prayer.
What the sponsors obviously intended, however, was to
write an amendment which would allow school authorities to
control and sponsor prayer. If the proposed amendment were
interpreted to allow this result, the situation of religion in
the public schools would be returned to what it was in the
Engel and Schempp cases, with one major difference. With
the addition of the Wylie Amendment to the Constitution, the
courts would be powerless to control any infringement of
minority rights, as long as the prayer could be said to be
voluntary. The local school authorities, under H.R.J. Res. 191,
would be free to establish any denominational prayer which
would be written by government, recited under government
supervision, and directed by the government. Nothing in this
broad authorization would put any control whatever over the
type of prayer selected, and any school board could, completely
beyond the reach of the courts, offer the majority's favorite
prayers exclusively. Children of different persuasions could
be forced daily to go through the embarrassing procedure of
excusing themselves from the room or sitting mute while the
majority of their classmates join the teacher or other author-
ity in "voluntary" prayer. The Wylie Amendment would thus
reverse the 180-year-old tradition in this country of protect-
ing the rights of the minority against infringement by the
51. 117 Cong. Rec. H10648 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1971).
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majority. It would make the right to true freedom of religion
subject to a majority vote. We should all thank Heaven that
the amendment was defeated. 52
While I have followed the history of religion in this
country for several years, and believe I have considered the
issues from several points of view before coming to any con-
clusions, it may be felt by some that I have been guilty of
doing that for which I criticize the sponsors of H.R.J. Res.
191. It may be said that I am simply reacting, and have de-
cided which conclusion I favor and only later considered the
arguments in order to support my view.
To this argument I have two responses. First, by sup-
porting the Supreme Court's decisions, I have not reacted
against the Wylie Amendment, but have defended the con-
tinuous and thoroughly considered growth of principles de-
signed to sustain religious freedom. Secondly, in this defense
of the Supreme Court's decisions, I believe I have fully con-
sidered the alternatives before, and not after, I reached my
conclusion. My conclusion is, of course, that the Wylie Amend-
ment was a disaster and was rightly defeated. While criticiz-
ing the Wylie Amendment (criticism is always easy), I have
taken pains to offer a better alternative (not always such an
easy task), and offer it now. It reads as follows:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . ."
52. 117 Cong. Rec. H10657 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1971).
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